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## TOP MLSPB FIGURES KILLED; GUNS, CASH SEIZED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 10 Jun 81 pp 1, 17

[Text] As the result of "Operation Broom" conducted by Istanbul police before dawn, six terrorists, members of the central committee of the illegal "MLSPB [Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Union] organization, including two of the most important directors of the group, Tamer Arda and Atilla Ermutlu, were seized. Arda and Ermutlu, along with two other terrorists, were killed and two terrorists, one a woman, were wounded during the operation. In the wake of the sweep, 10 pistols, three light machine guns and one G-3 rifle were found at "cell houses" used by the terrorists and at a store owned by the group. Also found and seized was 2,451,000 lira in cash and an 8-million lira check taken by the illegal organization's militants during their latest crime when they killed a soldier during a money delivery in front of the Kocasinan Tax Office.

Officials, who stated that the outlaw "MLSPB" had henceforth been consigned to history, announced that as the result of the operation central committee members Tamer Arda, Atilla Ermutlu, Dogan Ozzumrut and Ercan Yurtbilir had been killed and Hulya Ozzumrut and Yavuz Akkus wounded during their arrests. It was stated that the terrorists had perpetrated robberies at jewelry stores in the Cennet ward and in Eyup and had been involved in the Cerrahpasa and Hipodrom robberies, as well as having broken into homes and stores, committed murder, chosen the security forces as "targets" for themselves and participated in bloody incidents without blinking an eye.

## Militants Captured

Long-term operations conducted by the Istanbul police have brought about the arrest of 344 militants of the devastated "MLSPB" organization and litigation has begun with requests for the death penalty for 36 of these individuals. However, when Tamer Arda, Dogan Ozzumrut, his wife Hulya Ozzumrut, Ercan Yurtbilir, Atilla Ermutlu and Yavuz Akkus, who form the illegal organization's brain trust, went about committing more robberies and continued their activities, the entire Istanbul police force took to their trail. The police teams, which identified the houses in which the terrorists were staying and the store they had rented on behalf of the organization, began their operation, known among the police by the code name "Broom," before dawn. While the Political Police "strike Teams," wearing bullet-proof vests, surrounded the previously-identified house at 55 Inonu Avenue in Kartal, Maltepe, teams from the public security office also secured the area. In



answer to the security force's order to surrender, Dogan Ozzumrut and Hulya Ozzumrut, along with Ercan Yurtbilir, an escapee from the Nigde Prison who had been tried under a request for the death penalty, shouted "slogans," after which gunfire erupted as the terrorists opened fire on security forces. At the end of a short exchange of gunfire Dogan Ozzumrut and Ercan Yurtbilir were dead and a wounded Hulya Ozzumrut was captured as she tried to escape through a window. Police officials are evaluating documents seized at the house, where they also found four pistols.

#### In Sefakoy

Afterwards, security forces rushed to the Sefakoy area and surrounded it. Atilla Ermutlu, driving in a car bearing license plates previously identified by the police, was headed toward the airport intersection when he was ordered to stop. He disregarded the warning and attempted to escape whereupon he was hit by gunfire and seriously wounded. Ermutlu died while being taken to the hospital. The immediate area around a store in Sefakoy at number 5 Cakar Street in the Fevzi Cakmak ward, which the organization had rented and used, was surrounded. As notorious terrorist Tamer Arda arrived along with Yavuz Akkus at the store at 7:15 in the morning, they were met by the call "You are surrounded. Surrender yourselves to the security forces." The terrorists, however, opened fire and again a fire-fight erupted. Tamer Arda was killed in the clash while Yavuz Akkus was wounded and escaped. Akkus was subsequently captured when he arrived at a "cell house," known to belong to the illegal organization, where police had set up a "police station." A search of the store belonging to the "MLSPB" yielded six 14-shot pistols, two 32-shot MAT light automatic pistols, one Chinese-made She automatic pistol and a G-3 rifle taken from a murdered soldier. Additionally, money and checks stolen during a money delivery from the Kocasinan Tax Office were found and confiscated.

#### Their Crimes

The crimes committed by the central committee members of the outlaw "MLSPB" who were killed or wounded during their arrest were announced as follows:

An armed attack on a grocery store and the murder of Sedat Sen, in Cibali; the murder of grocery store owners Sukru, Ahmet and Orhan Bolukbasi in Alibeykoy, and the murder of watchman Ali Samur there; in Gaziosmanpasa--the robbery at Oztuna Clothing Industries, the wounding of Mustafa Yilmaz, director of the Grundig Factory Works, the attack on the home of the NAP's Gaziosmanpasa district chairman, Ali Riza Altinok, and the murder of Altinok, his wife Fahriye, and daughter Nilgun, the robberies of the Is Bankasi's Kanarya branch and the Ziraat Bankasi branch in Fikirtepe; the murders of the NAP's Istanbul Provincial Chairman Recep Nasatli and his son Mustafa in Kadikoy; the murder of six persons, one a policeman, during a robbery in Hipodrom at which 5 million lira was taken; the murder of one American and the wounding of two other Americans in Atakoy; the murder of employee Salih Dursun during the theft of 15 million lira in Cerrahpasa; in Pendik, the murder of retired Navy Commander Cihangir Erdeniz, an armed attack on the offices of HERGUN newspaper and the murder of Muslum Karatas; a robbery at the Social Security office in Cemberlitas; in Kartal-Maltepe, the murder of the director of the Stad Steel Works, Nasret Seven Kadiroglu and the robbery of a

jewelry store in Cennet ward; the murder of four Americans in Florya, Senlikkoy; the robbery of a jewelry store and the murder of EL-AL director Abraham Elazar; the wounding of six Americans in Fikirtepe; in Suadiye, the murder of driver Ali Temel by means of placing a remote-controlled bomb in his car; in Zeytinburnu--the murder of the NAP's Zeytinburnu district chairman Bekir Sendilmen, an armed attack on a coffee house in Kucukcekmece, Tepeustu, where one person was killed and 22 others wounded, the murder of rightist Arif Uzun and the murder of the NAP's former Bakirkoy district chairman, Mehmet Basak, as well as the murder of Meric Dikici; the murder of Headman Necip Coskun in Gungoren; and in Demirciler Sitesi, an armed attack on a store and the murder of four persons, including a father, son and relative, an armed attack on a personnel bus belonging to the Kale Kilit factory.

9236

CSO: 4634/27

## BISHOPS ISSUE DOCUMENT ON ECONOMIC CRISIS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 25 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Pierre Arnold]

[Text] On Tuesday, the bishops of Belgium published a long document on the economic crisis affecting our country. The text is highly subtle but nevertheless constitutes a very clear position on social questions.

Furthermore, the document is presented as a sounding board, an invitation for an exchange of ideas and a confrontation of the most diverse points of view.

While remaining within their own province -- reflections of an ethical nature -- the bishops hope to make their document an instrument for dialog, work and reflection that may eventually lead to what they call "pockets of hope." A more technical commentary on these considerations, which are necessarily quite general, is planned for the coming months.

The text just made public is entitled "Christians and the Crisis: Suggestions for Dialog," and is conceived as an extension of two preceding documents: "Europe's Vocation" (followed by a commentary), published in November 1976, and the recent statement issued by French-speaking bishops on the economic situation in Wallonia in January 1981.

Since the council, moreover, economic and social problems have constituted the central theme of most of the positions taken by the popes and the hierarchy. For the record, we would cite the "Mater" and "Magistra" encyclicals of Pope John XXIII, "Populorum Progressio" of Pope Paul VI and the recent speeches made by Pope John Paul II in Brazil and the Philippines.

## Subtle Language

The document is in four parts. The first contemplates the current "division of minds engendered by the crisis" and the need to "renew loyal and sincere exchanges between all partners." The second part is a reflection on the lower level of well-being. It is a frank questioning of certain dogmas of our society, which confuses "having a lot" with "well-being." The bishops doubt that the happiness of man is to be found in the frantic consumer race. For them, the change in thinking required by the current crisis is perhaps a chance to begin a different society. In this second chapter, one finds the important positions taken on behalf of the



very poor. This orientation, already very clear in the last document of the Walloon bishops in January, is further accented here.

The third chapter of the reflection has to do with unemployment. It immediately deflates the negative "a prioris" concerning those without work. Emphasizing the psychological and social problems caused by unemployment, the bishops particularly point out the main victims: the young, women, foreigners.

While emphasizing the need for a new way of thinking on the subject of work, the bishops allude to a number of solutions now being debated. Reduction of the work week, doing away with multiple jobs, part-time work and the creation of a "third circuit" are perhaps possible solutions for what the document calls the "injustice" of unemployment.

In the fourth part, the document comes out in favor of a reform of social security giving priority to the weakest, establishing a reasonable ceiling based on the type of household involved and aimed at a real integration of those without jobs into social life.

#### New Look

The document, which commits bishops on the national level, is necessarily less precise and more neutral than the short position paper in January on the subject of the Walloon basin. In the diagnosis of the crisis in particular, one does not find a word about the "political" and "community" causes of the difficulties we are now experiencing. But while limiting themselves to economic matters and their moral evaluation, the bishops nevertheless add new things. They speak, for example, about a "redistribution of available work," with respect to unemployment. They are not afraid to label tax evasion as a "social sin" and to so qualify other practices such as the capital drain, and so on. They ask people to "look at the world through the eyes of the poor," and so on. They even speak about the "democratization and humanization" of the system of production.

The insanity of partisan logic causes such a stir in this country that it leaves very little room for lucid, wise words. It is to be hoped that the prestige of the bishops will succeed in creating that movement of solidary creativity on the part of all Belgians that the bishops are calling for with all their hearts.

11,464

CSO: 3100/805

## BRIEFS

TRADING FIRM SUBSIDY--The total state subsidy to The Royal Danish Greenland Trading Company (Den kongelige grønlandske Handel) activities in 1980 amounted to 115.4 million kroner. This is an increase of 11 million kroner compared to the preceding year. The largest share of the appropriations were devoted to the production and sales business, which is responsible for having sold Greenland products totaling 420 million kroner. The sector employed 1,750 people. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 10 Jul 81 p 3]

CSO: 3106/144

## MITTERRAND'S PAST, PRESENT, PROJECTED POLICIES, GOALS

## End to Paternalism Expected

Paris LE CONTINENT in French 21 May 81 pp 7

[Text] There were thousands of them at Place de la Bastille in Paris on the night of 10 May: the "immigrant workers" who were celebrating the "historic victory" of Francois Mitterrand alongside the thousands of Frenchmen. They were not shouting: "We won," but rather, "We're going to have a chance to win." The circumspection is appropriate. Nevertheless, they could not help "celebrating," dancing with each other, and with their "French comrades."

"Because," one of them says, "perhaps now we're going to get our rights, that is the right of organization for immigrant workers, the abrogation of the 1939 law that prohibits foreigners from organizing and putting out a newspaper. We also hope that we will be given the right to vote in municipal elections, that we will be recognized as full-fledged citizens. Mr Mitterrand should also commit himself to recognize the right of all foreign workers who have their identification papers to travel freely in France."

With respect to French policy in Africa, "we want to see the end of the gunboat policy" (of Giscard d'Estaing), he continues, "but we must not have too many illusions: the socialists call for increased French exports, and that could be translated into a continuation of pillaging the Third World. We are at least asking the question. Their intentions are certainly very noble, but we will judge them by their actions."

"A Sclerotic Policy"

There was visible pleasure among African diplomats on 11 May. "The French policy seems sclerotic to me, there has been no change in a long time," we were told by one of them. For him, "the socialist experiment called for by President Mitterrand is going perhaps to run into many problems, because it has long been shunted aside, and also because the outgoing majority will not help him conduct French affairs. The African policy of the outgoing president was not conducted masterfully: one even had the impression sometimes that he did not understand our continent. Despite his paternalistic love for Africa, I do not think he truly understood African issues. One could see this in Chad and the Central

African Republic. The latter was not only a political defeat but also a shameful scandal for the Elysee. I think that General De Gaulle understood Africa better, and that his policy, despite everything, was more coherent. So Mitterrand's election can only be a good thing for us Africans. Aside from a few countries which were very close to the former president, but which themselves also poorly understood the policy carried out in Chad and the CAR [Central African Republic]. This was the case particularly for Ivory Coast and Zaire."

"My position is very simple," we were told by a diplomat from anglophone Africa: "wait and see. Naturally, there will be a real change in France's policy in Africa, particularly in the Sahara conflict. But it will first of all be necessary for France to choose to play a precise political role rather than seeking to defend its interests, and it will have to do so without regard to which particular individual is heading a country or to its political orientation. For us anglophone Africans, the francophones too often forget there are other Africans when they talk to Paris. But the most important change will concern southern Africa. At least this is our hope."

A former North African minister confided to us his "hopes" in that area, particularly with respect to southern Africa and North Africa: "Mr Mitterrand has the chance both to take a fresh look at the dispute with Algeria and also to take a position on the Sahara question that will require Algeria and Morocco not to engage in an armed conflict... There will probably be some changes, but no great reversals: the position of the socialists on Chad has not always been very clear. Giscard d'Estaing made a serious mistake in considering African policy his private preserve and by trying to consolidate the relations with Africa he inherited from his predecessors. He wanted to maintain the Gaullist patrimony without making any changes, by resuming all the practices of Jacques Foccart (adviser on African affairs to De Gaulle and Pompidou). But above all, the former president did not take into account one fundamental fact: by his policy toward the established regimes, he blocked all the aspirations expressed by the new generations of Africans. And that cannot continue."

Finally, an African thinker who welcomed the Mitterrand victory "without, of course, jumping through the ceiling," told us he is convinced that the socialists' coming to power "can bring about the conditions for change in Africa. What is most important is that Giscard is gone. For at last we will have the chance to decide what we ourselves want, particularly in Central Africa, where the people took to the streets to express their happiness."

He is not expecting great changes from Mr Mitterrand himself, but rather from "the young people and the strength which is behind the French president, from people who have been educated with us and who have a sense of the dignity of man. I think that we can begin a frank dialogue with them, for we are all a part of the same "computer generation," while in the past we had to deal with former colonial administrators who could not hide their overlord--even racist--mentality. The first thing France should stop is that form of cooperation which consists in injecting capital into Africa without the prior establishment of an economic infrastructure capable of promoting real development.



Secondly, the socialists should know that real development requires the acquisition of real dignity. Without deep and reciprocal respect, assistance will provoke only more corruption. We do not want paternalism in any form. Africans must no longer be told what they have to do. I would like to see us consulted about what we really need. We are of age."

#### End of Neocolonialism Hoped For

Paris LE CONTINENT in French 21 May 81 p 7

[Commentary by Justin Vlayra]

(Text) The French people have elected Francois Mitterrand to serve the interests of France for the next 7 years. Africans should first of all be thankful for the fact that in a democratic France such a major shift could occur.

After the defeat of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who served France according to his lights--and whom it would be indecent to abuse by ingratitude today--it would be childish to divide the field into winners' and losers' camps. We are speaking, of course, of the Africans. If our future in Africa is so closely tied to the result of one election in France, it is because our minds have not yet been "decolonialized" and because we have not yet really come to the point of being able to think by ourselves for ourselves.

Over the course of recent years, we have seen the institutions of government in some African countries evolve in a generally satisfactory fashion. From year to year, political power has been freed from a number of neocolonial constraints under the pressure of events: the economic crisis, the rise of the younger generations. Given further time, democracy will advance too. If not, the regimes will be unable to withstand the deep urge of the people for freedom and justice. It has taken 20 years to realize this: development can only really begin with some kind of democracy, whether African-style or something else, as its base. This is doubtless one of the reasons why Africans as a whole have shown so much interest in political debate and have listened so attentively to socialist rhetoric, which is generous by definition. This was already the case in 1946, right after World War II, when the leaders of the African Democratic Rally (RDA) allowed themselves to be seduced by the French Communists into concluding a tactical alliance with them in the national assembly to press for hastening the liberation of Africa. At the same time, other African politicians were turning toward the French Socialists. They went from alliance to alliance, from rupture to rupture, right up until independence in 1960. Times have changed.

At the present time, one finds Africa is almost equally divided between socialist and liberal regimes, which coexist there after a fashion. It is Mr Mitterrand's good fortune to be well-acquainted with several African leaders, including President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. He is also, fortunately, a prudent man, not content merely with the analysis of Socialist Party theoreticians who seem to have answers for everything where Africa is concerned.

The real dialogue with African countries is yet to begin. It will begin once the new president--if he is able--wins a majority in the national assembly, bridges



the communists, reassures the labor syndicates, and solidly bolsters the franc. Relations between sovereign peace-loving states require diplomacy for their manifestation and consolidation. It is through this often slow and tedious work that the states discover their objectives, and define them in precisely shaded terms.

Before the new French diplomacy becomes operational, Mr Mitterrand and his team cannot remain insensitive to our continent's legitimate desire to rid itself of the ignominious practice of apartheid. In the midst of other African concerns remains fair remuneration for raw materials, which are at the mercy of the unrestrained and ruthless voracity of speculators. A more ethical France, led by a socialist president, has a better chance of reconciling the interests of the peoples of Europe and Africa.

#### PS 'Africa Strategy' Document

Paris LE CONTINENT in French 21 May 81 pp 8-9

[Text] Early in May 1981 the PS published an important document titled "The Socialist Party and Sub-Saharan Africa," which explains the "African strategy" President Mitterrand intends to pursue (see LE CONTINENT of 12 May). Important excerpts from this document are published below. President Mitterrand had previously discussed some aspects of the problem in the interview published by LE CONTINENT on 24 April. In addition, on 19 December 1979 at the time of an important parliamentary debate on France's Africa policy, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the PS national secretary, had discussed his party's position on Africa: we publish extracts from his remarks in the following sidebar.

#### Negritude: The Escalating Crisis

Africa has entered a critical stage which can only intensify rapidly: there is of course an ecological crisis, of which the drought in the Sahel is only one factor; the crisis of subsistence and the economic crisis certainly, which put a majority of states in a position of complete impotence; a probably short-term health crisis; and finally a political crisis, which is in part the cause, and in part the consequence, of the current difficult situation. The southern part of Africa is also stricken with one of the greatest injustices of our time, the shameless exploitation of man by man through the apartheid policy.

Africa's fragility has causes that have deep roots in the past, but no permanent causes. Africa is neither more nor less endowed than the other continents; but as both a direct and an indirect consequence of the slave trade and of a large part of the colonial period, it remains relatively unpopulous (...)

Africa has very little economic weight at present: this is so well known it needs no further proof. It also suffers from a lack of ideological originality. The feeling of negritude, which is based on the cultural wealth of art or religion, or

in a more general sense based on a profoundly humane mode of existence in society, based also on a revolt against domination, does not really provide a unifying cultural patrimony that is capable of addressing in a coherent way the problems of the contemporary world.

Africa, in this area, continues to proceed on the basis of foreign models which it utilizes without really embodying them, which facilitates spectacular political reversals. Even the national liberation struggles have not, it seems, led to ideological creativity: the adoption of Marxism-Leninism in Angola and Mozambique was after independence and seems to us the result of a political and diplomatic choice more than an allegiance based on an analysis of the state of social relationships.

#### Authenticity: Weakness in the State

A state only acquires a foundation from a consensus of citizens on the idea of a society, and it is this which one especially finds missing in Africa. The principles of the existence and the functioning of the state came from the outside and remain largely alien. This is true to such an extent that foreign "cooperation" is often today an ontological necessity: through it the foreign models of thought, and operations, as well as of daily life and consumption which justify and lay the foundation of the apparatus of state, are maintained. What is especially true today of Western cooperation will also very soon doubtless be the case for cooperation from the communist states.

Poorly rooted, based on models and techniques that are neither economically nor socially relevant, the structures of the state are thus extremely vulnerable. Doubtless it would be unkind to deny categorically that they have any relationship at all--at least in a compromised fashion--to the national realities.

Ivorian capitalism maintains itself only by virtue of the effects of relative economic success and outside support: it also finds some responsive chords in the traditional societies, which are characterized by ostentation. Tanzanian socialism, by contrast, draws its force from societies much more imbued with egalitarian traditions. But these are cases of exceptional stability in Africa; more often the mismatch appears forcefully and causes various types of reactions. Among these complex and still poorly analyzed reactions is the search for indigenous black African models. Tanzanian Ujamaa was an effort to express socialism (in African terms). There are hints of this also (but without enough evidence to make a conclusive judgment) in Guinea-Bissau. More often, it has served to mask other policies, under the form of assertion of "authenticity" in Zaïre and Togo. But, under the surface of the political superstructures, it really seems that other forms of social and economic organization, other networks of relationship, are being born or revived: autarchic living in village communities, or efforts to establish new base communities with the participation, in Senegal and Mali in particular, of groups of emigrants to Europe, the strengthening of networks of African traders who scoff at borders, etc.

At the present time the continent has entered into a phase of mutation--still underground, perhaps fecund--but whose varied manifestations have only a single point in common: they are responses to the disintegration of most of the state

institutions which came out of decolonization--while at the same time they accelerate that disintegration, which is not merely the result of the inadequacies of certain leaders, nor of foreign economic and political domination.

### **Intervention: The West Exploits**

Very simple in its broad lines, the policy of the former colonial powers, and primarily of France, was to maintain the status quo, whatever it was, without paying too much attention to ideological facades, so far as there were any, and to preserve the benefits they enjoyed along with the essential mechanisms for economic domination, that is, not the control of production but a lock on the exchange of goods and services. The United States, which in the 1950's seems to want to hasten decolonization for its own benefit, was in reality not very involved in the whole process, except for investing in several countries where operations were profitable (particularly in southern Africa) and giving strong support to a few regimes judged to be of strategic importance, such as Kenyatta's Kenya, Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, and the Portuguese colonial system. All it did, in a word, was to accentuate the conservative character of the policy of the Western countries.

This being the case, we have contributed to keeping injustice alive and maintaining hotbeds for major explosions, southern Africa and Ethiopia in particular, while on the other hand we provoked, or accelerated, a process of general political disintegration.

The drought in Ethiopia and the fall of the conservative Portuguese regime were enough to considerably alter the balance of power on the continent, but the establishment of zones of Soviet preponderance was not an inevitable consequence of these important events: the new leaders of Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola only agreed to accept it under the pressure of circumstances; it was the gross blunders, or the cowardice, of the Western powers that in large part led to it.

### **Islam: Libyan Proselytizing**

Another spectacular change is the growing weight of the Muslim countries of North Africa and the Middle East on sub-Saharan Africa. Economically it results from the actions taken by almost all the oil-producing countries, who among themselves carry out a subtle struggle for influence which manifests itself above all in the Sudan-Sahel states, where Islam is strongly established. Culturally, it has gained new prestige, because of its status as a non-colonial civilization, and because of its new oil wealth. Politically, it seems to boil down to a contest between the countries of the Maghreb--Morocco, Algeria, and Libya--the object of which is influence on the Sahara, which is apt to become once again what it was in the Middle Ages, a connecting link between the two halves of the continent. The Saharan-Moroccan conflict, like the war in Chad, has brought new life to the old roads crossing the desert. They have also brought the ominous threat of a new predominance of the northern countries of the continent.

Incontestably the greatest anxiety is caused by Libya's presence in sub-Saharan Africa. As much as the atrocities committed by Idi Amin and Bokassa, the



influence which Col Qadhafi acquired over them probably explains the cautious position African leaders have taken with respect to the French interventions, even though they were in both cases, to varying degree, questionable. But Libya's intervention in Chad, and even more the proposed merger between the two states, gave rise to a vigorous move to condemn these actions on the part of the governments, which feel themselves directly threatened by the military power of the Jamahiriya, which has established as a formal principle not only Islamic proselytizing but also the withering away of the state.

#### Points of Anchorage: The USSR Establishes a Foothold

Soviet policy in Africa has been distinguished up to now by legalism: the USSR has collaborated with very diverse regimes. Its policy seems a long-term one: to benefit from a certain number of reliable points of penetration, to get established there firmly in various services, particularly the police, the army, and intelligence, by means of technical cooperation and the training of technicians in communist countries, and to insert little by little growing numbers of favorably disposed people.

While Soviet policy may not thus have created open conflicts on the continent, it has hardly contributed to resolving those which already existed: it could doubtless have hastened the fall of Ian Smith's regime, but did not try, even though it would have been as simple as destabilizing the chrome market; as a big gold-producing country, it could also, doubtless, have created more problems for South Africa. In the military support it has provided, it has often appeared circumspect, indeed little concerned with supporting the most radical movements: the example of Zimbabwe seems striking, where the Soviets, instead of arming Mugabe, armed Momo, the man who compromised with Ian Smith and the spokesman of an embryonic African bourgeoisie. Even in Eritrea, where it has provided powerful support to the Ethiopian military, it is not certain that it is aiming for the most rapid possible elimination of the liberation movements.

Not to hasten either the appearance of violent conflicts, or the resolution of those which have already broken out, seems to be a rule for the Soviets, and, but perhaps in lesser degree, for their allies. They aim more to assure themselves--both in peaceful situations and in conflicts, of points of anchorage which will be fully utilized whenever the evolution of social forces and the exacerbation of tensions on the continent or elsewhere makes them truly operational and necessary.

In the present situation, Soviet influence appears to be total only in a few countries where it is not seriously or honestly rivalled; that influence is not, however, in any way irreversible, as is shown by the evolution of Egypt and Somalia.

#### Interests: Giscard the Firebug Fireman

Given the realities (of French political, economic, military and cultural interests), one might try to define Giscard's strategy on the continent as political and economic conservatism, joined with a strategy of expansion beyond

the traditional sphere of influence, facilitated for a time by the relative indifference of the other Western powers. The policy of the French Government can be defined in terms of a series of concentric areas.

In the middle, the "hard core" of the former colonial empire. One might regard it as being cut into or fissured: a number of countries have in principle or in fact opted for political and economic orientations that are quite different from those of France (Benin, Congo, Madagascar). But Giscard, following in De Gaulle's footsteps, considers on the one hand that these orientations are not irreversible (and the example of Guinea has encouraged him in this idea), and on the other hand that, even when a point of no return has been reached, ideological divergences do not prevent the preservation of special relationships, even of a certain "complicity."

Immediately beyond this core is found a "greater French-speaking Africa," part of which may seem to be in the process of being absorbed into the previous zone. It includes the former Belgian colonies, and both the isolated Portuguese-speaking (Guinea-Bissau) and English-speaking (Sierra Leone, Gambia) enclaves. The cases of Nigeria and Ghana are less open and shut: these are "big mouthfuls" which do not let themselves be absorbed as easily, but which French policy groups with the rest. Certainly, one might think that Nigeria's demographic and economic weight is already such that this country could "imitate" France and capture its sphere of influence. In reality, it seems to us that the government's theory (and it is not absurd) is basically the following: the fear of African hegemonism, more difficult in one sense to counter, is sufficiently marked that, in order to counterbalance Nigerian influence, the francophone countries will make or keep France a player in West African diplomacy and organizations.

The French attitude is the policy of a firebug fireman: incapable of helping resolve national problems, when it does not actually create them through its own bungling, an accessory (both in southern Africa and in the Sahara) to the growth of serious tension through its contempt for the rights of people to determine their own destinies, the Elysee has maintained its grip on a number of states because of the problems they face, problems which it has itself created or maintained. The foundations of Giscard's policy are the following axioms: the weaker a state, the stronger France is within it; the poorer a state, the less costly it is to maintain it under our influence.

#### Apartheid: Isolate Pretoria

In southern Africa, the continuation of a racist regime is one of the greatest injustices of our time. Its more and more violent policy is a threat to the entire continent. It is folly to believe, as the right asserts, that economic development is gradually leading to the dismantlement of apartheid: the forms change, but the principles remain the same.

A leftist government must take immediate measures to quit comforting the Pretoria regime by financial and technical support. It will resolve to halt all public or para-public investment, and all assistance to private investment in South Africa and occupied Namibia; it will embrace the economic sanctions called for



by the U.N. It will reduce its imports from South Africa as rapidly as possible taking into account technical constraints.

France should also give political support, and increased economic and technical assistance to the Front Line countries, which are especially suffering from the South African threat. It should act on similar principles with respect to the refugees and militants of the South African and Namibian liberation movements.

#### **Self-Determination: A Federation on the Horn**

The situation is also very worrisome in Northeast Africa, where, among other things, an extremely violent conflict continues in Eritrea. The PS, which recognizes Eritrean nationhood and the right of that people to self-determination, maintains friendly and regular relations with the FPLE (Eritrean People's Liberation Front) and supports its proposal for a referendum on self-determination. It has also maintained a dialogue with the Ethiopian Government; it attaches great importance to the evolution of this country toward a more just and more prosperous society; and it is fully aware of the necessity for it to be guaranteed secure access to the sea. However violent the conflicts, the Horn of Africa is perhaps the very place where an inter- or supranational organization comprising Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti should be put in place as quickly as possible.

#### **Peace: A Conference on the Indian Ocean**

The problem of the Indian Ocean. The increasing number of military bases in this ocean, the expansion of naval forces and troops belonging to the great powers that has resulted, is very understandably upsetting to the states bordering it. In the short term, the slogan "Indian Ocean zone of peace" seems utopian; nevertheless, France, which plays an important role in the area, with its military bases and its territorial presence, should work actively to promote that idea.

It will at one level need to resolve the disputes which mar its relations with the Comoros archipelago, and it should be understood that this decision is inseparable from the cessation of any support to the illegal regime of Ahmed Abdallah, who was put in power by mercenaries with the complicity of Giscard's government. At another level we will need to come to terms with Madagascar and the island of Mauritius on the question of their demands regarding the "small islands."

France should participate in the conferences scheduled to discuss establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. This being the case, it will be necessary to maintain the strict distinction—to the degree the problem arises, and without prejudice to the future of the Reunion people—between France's position as an Indian Ocean nation (by virtue of Reunion and the Southern Territories), which assumes a military presence simply for the security of these portions of the national territory, and her position as a great power, maintaining strategic forces under the currently tense situation.

Concerned by recent signs of rapprochement between the United States and South Africa, we need to stress that any attempt to integrate the South African naval

base of Simonstown into the western military camp would be a very serious threat to peace in that zone. We intend to firmly oppose it.

#### **Stability: No Compromise of Frontiers**

Saharan regions and the Sudan-Sahel zone. With the rapid changing of the situation in Chad and the growing role of Libya, this zone has become one of the most explosive on the continent. Libya's economic means and military power, its religious and ideological prestige as well, have a considerable effect on very impoverished countries; the process of the withering away of the state begun in Libya has been extended, whether intentionally or not on Libya's part, into the whole region. It is not for us to make the choice for Africans, but that choice should be a free one. To our way of thinking, and the principles from which it springs, no compromise of the borders set in the colonial period is acceptable: this is why we have taken a position in favor of self-determination for the Saharan people (and we have done the same for Eritrea).

Certainly, Africa's borders are artificial, but this is true everywhere in the world: they nevertheless make some sense in the framework of a freely agreed political contract binding all the inhabitants: it is this contract which must be clearly defined. Now the stability of the Sudan-Sahel zone is subjected among other things to an attenuation from the very considerable regional imbalances of this, means of transcending statal frameworks can and should be sought. From this point of view, it is with very great interest that we are following initiatives such as the conferences of heads of states bordering on the Sahara, and in this connection we are particularly appreciative of Algeria's contribution.

#### **Military Bases: Guarantee Security**

So long as a real process of development has not begun, local conflicts and the insecurity related to the break-up of certain states (like Uganda, for example) will be a threat for all African countries. This it is appropriate, to the extent that it is desirable, for France to contribute to their security.

Therefore, military cooperation in the training of personnel and in equipping the armed forces in accordance with the resources and the needs of the individual countries will be continued, though either party is free to request a review of the provisions of the agreement, and accords may be signed with other countries.

We could in no way condemn the entire principle of defense agreements, it being understood that their aim should be the protection of states against external threats, and not the unconditional protection of regimes or rulers. But almost all the defense agreements were signed at a very early date, and these texts undoubtedly need to be updated; indeed, some of them are senseless. The accord signed with the present government of the Comoros is morally and politically unjustifiable. It will be the responsibility of a leftist government to renegotiate the defense accords with the governments concerned.

The presence of French military bases in certain African countries is not strictly tied to the conclusion of defense agreements, nor to the availability of military facilities in certain countries. In all probability, technical means at our disposal should make it possible to economize. On the other hand, the permanent presence of the French army is a factor producing internal tension; in various ways it works against a free dialogue between rulers and ruled; it has not even guaranteed the survival of several regimes, even though this is one of its unavowed purposes: the examples of Madagascar and Chad are proof of this. Therefore, the question of military bases should be treated separately, in an open and innovative spirit, with the countries concerned, taking into account their geostrategic position.

#### From 0.3 to 0.7 Percent: Reassessing Cooperation

Progressively more anemic, more and more ineffective and mercantile, France's contribution to the survival, first, and then the development of Africa needs profound reassessment. What we call cooperation is only one element, albeit an important one, and its functioning needs to be completely recast. It is not a question of using it cold-bloodedly to acquire or maintain "influence," that is to say to satisfy short-term political interests, or to consolidate already acquired and often questionable economic benefits.

But we must look beyond cooperation, which is a partial but not a final solution, and a leftist government has a duty to struggle actively for the establishment of more equitable relationships on a global scale; this is particularly crucial for a continent which contains almost all of the poorest countries in the world.

By increasing its aid to the level of 0.7 percent of its GNP, exclusive of the DOM-TOM (Overseas Departments-Overseas Territories), (instead of the current 0.3 percent) France would have the means to help other countries without abandoning traditional ties.

But we would have to exclude from the start racist regimes (primarily South Africa) and those in which violation of human rights constitutes a sort of governing principle.

We believe that the political orientations espoused by the leaders reflect both unchallengeable personal choices and variations in circumstance related to external pressures. As an example, some political orientations unlike our own in francophone African countries relate to economic and political pressures applied by the current French Government, and it is the same in other parts of the continent under influences. Our cooperation should contribute to loosening this type of constraint, and expanding the freedom of choice... For a long time, aid to development and development itself were thought of too exclusively in terms of states considered separately. For some time, international projects have been appearing in greater and greater number, but to our way of thinking it makes sense to diversify still further the scale of the various projects.

With rare exceptions, African states have neither the demographic nor the economic weight necessary to become credible entities on a global scale, particularly to



be the centers of balanced industrial development. So it is appropriate to encourage the creation of balanced economic groupings, making sure they are not built solely for the advantage of the most advanced and best endowed states. Monetary problems are already being addressed on this level, but in this domain the disparities resulting from colonialism still have unfortunate consequences.

The existence of a franc zone has indisputable advantages, but for too many francophone countries, the combination of a strong currency and a weak production apparatus, on a continent where the borders are extraordinarily permeable, is a serious handicap for industrial growth. Without prejudging results, this problem should be the object of a close examination with the interested countries.

### 'Decolonization' Challenged

Paris LE CONTINENT in French 21 May 81 p 8

[Commentary by J.P. Chevenement]

[Text] Legal decolonization (1960) was in no way accompanied by any decolonization in relations and practices. In how many countries have we not maintained as long as possible--and are we not maintaining still--the signs of an obsolete presence: support for colonial commercial concessions which no longer have any reason for existence, special support for merchants of the old days, including the chambers of commerce (we are thinking of Bangui) which remain local centers of influence, assistance (dramatically inadequate, moreover) to small whites who barely get by in the African countries, the constant clients and debtors of our consulates, while in fact they need to return to their place in the national community.

None of this is neutral: these French groups, holdovers from a bygone era, play an important role in the most dishonorable aspects of your policy: the small whites have been the target of an electoral racket that we have not forgotten, the colonists and merchants weigh very heavily in the policy of our embassies and consulates, even when you do not put them in the service of your political intrigues and your intelligence services, and all of them are hostage to your policy: concern for their security is, whenever it pleases you (but only in this case) a pretext for military intervention...

Zaire is not in your traditional sphere of influence, but French economic penetration has only been obtained by a multitude of compromises with a notoriously incompetent and corrupt regime. The twice-repeated dispatch of French troops there probably kept it from foundering. You generously provide it with Treasury loans to which it would not normally be entitled, even though--despite the protective care of the IMF--even the United States despairs of saving the country from bankruptcy, even though it fears it is seeing there the birth of a sort of second Iran; you shrug off lightly the risk of being its firmest supporter. But all the evidence goes to show that things are not being put right, and that the Zairian army, which we help train, continues to be a collection of pillagers and murderers...

So what purpose will French influence on the continent have served? What will you have done to maintain peace or give it new life? Wherever you have gone, the

fires continue to smolder. Have you defended human rights? This is the pretext you used to justify your intervention in Central Africa: it took you 14 years to do that. But the truth of the matter is you only pull out this noble motive when it suits you: right up to the end you maintained relations with Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea; so what does it matter that France and Guinea have become reconciled? Do you intervene on behalf of the political prisoners in Morocco? In Cameroon?

#### Mitterrand's Personal Background

Paris LE CONTINENT in French 21 May 81 p 10

[Text] Francois Mitterrand, the 21st president of the French Republic, will doubtless imprint on the Elysee a style much different from that of Mr Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Less protocol and more spontaneity. All the same, one should not ignore the similarities between the two personalities. The same proclivity for secrecy, the same penchant, perhaps, for a certain personal power. The two successive occupants of the presidential palace also share a remarkable aptitude for "long-range" work, for establishing long-term goals which determine day to day tactics.

A good policy is one which succeeds. Francois Mitterrand's election to the highest position of authority--after two defeats, in 1965 and 1974--tends to show that the strategy of union with the PCF was a good one. The gamble, however, might seem to have been a risky one. But the socialist leader kept to his course despite all difficulties. Including the break-up of the talks on implementing the "common governmental program" of the PCF and PS in September 1977. Despite incessant communist attacks on the PS's "swerve to the right," Francois Mitterrand kept this socialist party, which was reborn from its own ashes in 1979, firmly anchored. The vestiges of the SFIO [French Section of the Workers' International] accounted for only 5 percent of the votes at the time. The first surveys looking ahead to the upcoming legislative elections by contrast give the PS 35 percent of the votes.

The new president has already had some experience in power. In 1946 he was the youngest minister (in the Old Veterans) of General De Gaulle's first government. By 1957 he had occupied a total of 11 ministerial positions before becoming, little by little, starting in 1958, the spokesman for the opposition to the Gaullist regime.

More pragmatic than ideological, Francois Mitterrand cultivates his image of "quiet strength." Devoted to literature and a poet by avocation, he does not disguise his distaste for economic questions. But he is intelligent enough to surround himself with brilliant experts in that field. And he points out that two economists as distinguished as Giscard d'Estaing and Raymond Barre did not save France from the most serious economic crisis it has faced since World War II.

Married since 1944 to Danielle Gouze, Francois Mitterrand has two sons (Jean Christophe, 34, and Gilbert, 32). Mrs Mitterrand, who is a social recluse, is noted as an activist for the defense of human rights in Latin America.



## Mitterrand in the 1950's

Paris LE CONTINENT in French 21 May 81 p 10

[Article by Olivier Postel-Vinay]

[Text] The positions expressed by the PS on the problems of the Third World are also those of the new French president. His plans for decolonization and the development of a Third World which is not only independent but also socializing are not of recent origin. If one considers his career as a whole, Mr Mitterrand's professions of "pro-Third World" faith do not go back to a very distant epoch. They result from a deep political change which took place in 1964-1965 when he became the head of the opposition to General De Gaulle.

Under the Fourth Republic, during the course of which Mr Mitterrand held 11 ministerial positions, his comportment was not much different from that of the majority of politicians.

According to the governor on the scene at the time, the suppression of the Madagascar insurrection "resulted," as we say, in some 80,000 deaths. Mr Mitterrand, who was at that time a minister (from January 1947 to October 1949), did not break off from his government.

Named minister of overseas France the following year (July 1950), he tried to minimize the number of victims, saying: "I do not accept the idea of Madagascar as an associated state. There is no question of doing it, and there can be no question."<sup>1</sup> He did not protest against the sham trials of Malagasy parliamentarians nor against the numerous death sentences that were carried out against the leaders of the insurrection.

He did, however, adopt a more flexible position with the Ivorians of the RDA [African Democratic Rally]. After the 1950 riots in the Ivory Coast, he began a dialogue with Mr Houphouet-Boigny, while at the same time "doubling the garrisons in Africa," to use his very words. There was a twofold reward for this forbearance: the RDA broke with the Communist Party, and subsequently allied itself with the UDSR [Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance], Mitterrand's party.<sup>2</sup>

In 1952, Mitterrand also began a dialogue with Tunisian nationalists. As minister of state under Edgar Faure's government, he drew up a (secret) plan providing for Tunisia's internal autonomy. In August 1953, the deposing of the Sultan of Morocco drew his opposition, and the following month he resigned from the Laniel government to protest against the naming of a "hard" governor in Tunisia. But at the same time he wrote in L'EXPRESS (5 September 1953): "As far as I am concerned, the first imperative of our entire national policy is to maintain the French presence in North Africa, from Bizerte to Casablanca."

When the Algerian insurrection exploded in November 1954, he was minister of the interior, a position he had especially asked for in order to "manage" a situation which he correctly believed to be explosive.

He then had to reckon with the enormous pressure of the Algerian "lobby" on the Chamber of deputies, and with the massive popular hostility to any movement toward independence.

Certain passages of his stream of rhetoric on 12 November 1954 before the [national] assembly nevertheless deserve to be cited: "The outlaw, the common law criminal who hides in the mountains or the forest, suddenly decks himself out, for the purposes of a cause which is not even his own, in a false heroism on the basis of which efforts are made today to stir up the masses, who cannot accurately assess the advantages of the French presence... From Flanders to the Congo, if there is some difference in the application of our laws, the law is still imposed, and this law is French law, the law which you pass because there is only one parliament and only one nation... To preserve the French domain, this domain which extends, basically--as I just said--from Flanders to the Congo: this is our truth, the axis of our policy." He expressed resentment toward "that political staff which has manipulated poor people who were swept foolishly and tragically into an imbecilic adventure," and stated: "It is against the leaders, those responsible, that we must direct our repression more intensely... All those who try, one way or another, to create disorder and who insist on secession will be hit with all the means available under the law."

In July 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Mr Mitterrand was minister of justice in the Guy Mollet government. He did not dissociate himself from the Franco-British decision to intervene militarily. On the contrary, he was in the forefront, claiming that Nasser's nationalization of the canal reminded him of Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia<sup>3</sup>.

The war in Algeria grew bigger day after day. On 16 March 1956, the assembly voted "special powers" in Algeria. The following day, a decree prescribed that "henceforth, any offense committed after 31 October 1954, even indecent assaults, may be and in fact is removed from the jurisdiction of the common law tribunals."<sup>4</sup> Mr Mitterrand, the minister of justice, was thereby relieved of his responsibility for justice in Algeria. However, he did not resign. Moreover, death sentences must always receive the signature of the Guardian of the Seals; He signed. A number of Muslims were thus executed after a mockery of justice.<sup>5</sup>

Torture was organized in a systematic manner, with regular rounds, starting in February 1957. Because of the amounting horrors, Mendes-France and Savary had left the government on 23 May 1956. Mitterrand remained in his position until the fall of Guy Mollet, in April 1957. In October 1957, he agreed to participate in a new Mollet government, which was refused investiture.

It is true that Algeria had become a special case, in terms of the Maghreb. 1956 was also the year Morocco and Tunisia became independent. It was also the year of the "framework law on overseas territories" (black Africa and Madagascar),

which provided for "measures of decentralization and administrative deconcentration," the first steps toward a certain autonomy...

Mr Mitterrand lost all chance of coming back into power for a long time when the assembly, completely disabled, appealed to General De Gaulle in May 1958.

In a book published in November 1957, "French Presence and Relinquishment" (published by Plon), he made his political testament on decolonization: "France had brought peace, security, unity, and work to Algerian soil. It had made the rhythm of the seasons once again fecund; through its assistance it had protected children against disease and death, and by its culture, it had penetrated their minds, which without it would have remained mechanical, like dead stones."

On the subject of black Africa, he wrote:

"To watch over Africa, and to stay there, was it not first of all necessary to put our trust in Africans who know how to close their eyes to the mirage of an illusory nationalism?" For him, "the reform policy" (an allusion to the framework law) was "the ultimate safeguard of the French presence." He concluded: "In black Africa, well-conceived and opportune laws have not only preserved this presence, but they have even prepared the way for a federal community which, by means of association, will conquer separatism." He called for "a strongly structured central government in Paris, states and autonomous federated territories within an egalitarian and fraternal community whose borders will extend from the plains of Flanders to the forests of the equator."

All that is ancient history. Starting in 1964-1965, Mr Mitterrand completely changed his rhetoric. His friends maintain that he himself has changed in depth, and there is no reason to doubt it.

1. Cited by Franz-Olivier Giesbert, "Francois Mitterrand, or the Temptation of History," Seuil, 1977, p. 117. Written by a NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR journalist, this book is generally favorable to Mitterrand.
2. On this subject see Georgette Elgey, "The Republic of Illusions," Fayard, 1965.
3. Giesbert, op. cit., p. 167.
4. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, "Torture in the Republic," Editions de Minuit, 1972, p. 77.
5. On this subject see Germaine Tillon, "Complementary Enemies," Editions de Minuit, 1960.

#### Mitterrand's 'Africanists'

Paris Le CONTINENT in French 21 May 81 p 10

[Text] President Mitterrand's "henchmen" are ready to relieve the garrison. Among them are numerous "Africanists" who, contrary to those who worked for



Giscard d'Estaing, are for the most part neither "enarques" (graduates of the ENA, National School of Administration) nor former colonial administrators. Few come from the ministry of cooperation. Nearly all have lived for several years in Africa, particularly in the context of ORSTOM (Office of Overseas Scientific and Technical Research). In the lead one finds Lionel Joepin, today the PS first secretary, yesterday in charge of "international affairs" and especially the Third World. He will "follow very closely" the work of the woman who replaced him in that position: Veronique Nolertz (38 years old). Formerly a member of the "Choisir" feminist movement (of Gisèle Halimi), a graduate of HEC (Advanced Commercial Studies), the new PS head of international relations lived for 2 years in Madagascar. Next comes the emissary to the Third World, Lucien Praire. This pseudonym masks a high socialist official in the ministry of finance. He will oversee four "territorial officials" who will divide up the African continent and the Middle East: Alain Chenal (Middle East), R. Weexsteen, a geographer from Maracilles (North Africa), Jean-Pierre Raison (8 years in Madagascar, also a geographer), and Gabriel Arnaud (also a geographer, also a member of the CCFD, the Catholic Center Against Hunger and For Development). These last two will be assisted by two other "experts": Jean Audibert (from SNECMA, the National Aircraft Engine Study and Manufacturing Company, an ex-colonial administrator who is well connected with both ORSTOM and the all-powerful BRGM, the Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration). The second expert is Roland Colin, former chief of staff of Mamadou Dia, from the time when the latter was prime minister of Senegal, not to be confused with President Senghor's former interior minister, Jean Colin. Roland Colin heads IRPED (International Institute for Research and Training for Standardized Development), a private institute devoted to development problems.

Around this "staff" revolve several working groups, or rather "anipers," whose advice seems to be much appreciated by the PS and who will contribute to the elaboration of socialist policy options for Africa. One finds together here journalists (Claude Wauthier of AFP, and Philippe Leymarie), researchers (Yves Person), officials of NGO's (Non Governmental Organizations) (Philippe Parine of CCFD), as well as the Anti-Apartheid Movement team.

Two other individuals will play a special role, and a particularly important one: Claude Cheysson, member of the EEC Commission, who has been promised important responsibilities, and President Mitterrand's secretary, Paulette Decraene, who will be the connecting bridge between "the president's Africans" and the president himself.

What will become of the very old ministry of cooperation, which from the time of Robert Galley had been purged of almost all socialist sympathizers? It will not disappear right away, but very probably after the legislative elections. Will it be attached to the ministry of foreign affairs? Perhaps, if Claude Cheysson is named to be the head of French diplomacy. In any case, Mitterrand's "Africanists" would like to transform cooperation into an "agency" very probably attached to the prime minister, so that regional institutions, labor organizations, and the non-governmental organizations can play a role in it. For cooperation, as the PS sees it, must be "the business of all the French people."

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## PS TO RESPECT UN SANCTIONS; FAVORS ECONOMIC, MILITARY COOPERATION

Paris LE MONDE in French 22 May 81 p 18

[Article by Philippe Decraens--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] /"One of our most cherished plans is to move rapidly toward closer relations with the Front Line countries of southern Africa,"/ we were told by Mrs Veronique Neiertz, national PS secretary for international relations, commenting at LE MONDE's request on the 33-page document which the PS has prepared on black Africa. Titled simply "The PS and Sub-Saharan Africa," the text was prepared under the direction of Lucien Praire, head of the party's Third World group, and it was subjected to long internal discussions and fine tuning before it was made public.

After an initial surprise--and cautiousness--the first African reactions to the statements made from the department of the Nièvre have been rather favorable. The prevailing attitude among leaders as different in personality as Mr Felix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and Omar Bongo of Gabon is that the elevation of the (1990-1991) minister of overseas French territory to the presidency of the republic opens up possibilities for a new era in Franco-African relations. Now while the document elaborated by the PS may have many specific proposals and innovations, there is nothing immoderate about it.

The text errs through an excessive dramatization of the situation in Africa as a whole. One might also criticize it for a certain sentimental idealism in its presentation of the origins of the political fragility in the black continent.

/"We are concerned by the hardening of the American position in southern Africa, particularly with respect to Angola,"/ continues Mrs Veronique Neiertz, mentioning the periodic urge of the White House to come to a reconciliation with the guerrillas of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], the movement which threatens to destabilize the Luanda regime. Some of the statements by Mr Reagan and Mrs Kirkpatrick, the United States representative at the UN, are worrisome to those responsible for PS international policy, who want above all to prevent the Africans from committing themselves as members of one bloc or another. Thus, speaking of Zimbabwe, Mrs Neiertz said: /"As far as Robert Mugabe is concerned--and we deeply desire to see his admission to the Socialist International--we want him to be able, like all his African counterparts, to escape the logic of Yalta, that is alignment with one or another of the two blocs."/



On the subject of foreign intervention, the PS document blames that carried out by the Soviet Union primarily on /"the gross blunders or cowardice of the Western powers."/ It continues: /"Soviet policy in Africa has up to now been distinguished by its legalism: the USSR has never supported secession or rebel movements (except in southern Africa, and they could hardly be criticized for that), and has collaborated with the most diverse regime."/ And it goes on: /"In the current state of affairs, Soviet influence appears to be complete only in those countries where it is not seriously or honestly contested; it is not, however, irreversible in any way, as is shown by the evolution of Egypt and Somalia."/

One of the best points made about the evolution of black Africa concerns the importance of regional disparities and the appearance of certain regional centers of political influence.

While the roles played by Libya and Cuba in the brutal changes underway south of the Sahara may have been somewhat understated, the editors of the documents do not at all ignore them and, most important, they do not try to obfuscate it.

### Giscard d'Estaing's Failure

The failure of Mr Giscard d'Estaing's Africa policy, which almost no black African leader with the exception of Sekou Toure still disputes, is analyzed at great length. One finds, on this subject, the following vigorous condemnation: /"The majority of French interventions--completely voluntary, since carried out in countries with which we were not linked by defense agreements--aimed at dealing with almost hopeless situations, at the origin of which, in various ways, lay considerable French responsibility... The French attitude is the policy of a firebug fireman: incapable of helping resolve national problems, when it does not actually create them through its own bungling, an accessory (both in southern Africa and in the Sahara) to the growth of serious tension through its contempt for the rights of people to determine their own destinies, the Elysee has maintained its grip on a number of states because of the problems they face, problems which it has itself created or maintained."/

The PS, while critical of Giscard's France, is also critical of other powers, since it says: /"However bungling and scandalous may have been the actions of the French Government, the other powers hardly do any better: the USSR, for example, has shown itself equally hegemonistic and anxious to look out for its own interests, and it provides only extremely limited assistance."/ And in conclusion: /"Giscard's policy today has gone as far as it can go: the last 7 years have brought us to both military and economic failure."/

In the second part of the document, the editors define a new African policy, the broad lines of which should not be distressing to the African interlocutors in Paris. On southern Africa, we find: /"A leftist government should take immediate measures to cease abetting the Pretoria regime by its financial and technical assistance."/ It will declare a ban on any public or para-public investment, stop all aid to private investment in South Africa and occupied Namibia. It will respect the economic sanctions resolved by the UN. It will reduce its imports from South Africa as rapidly as possible, taking into account technical constraints... Regarding eastern Horn of the continent, we read: /"The PS, which recognizes the fact of Eritrean nationhood and the right of the people to self-determination, maintains friendly and regular relations with the Eritrean Popular

Liberation Front, and supports its proposal for a referendum on self-determination. It has also kept up a dialogue with the Ethiopian Government. It attaches great importance to the evolution of that country toward a more just and prosperous society, and it is fully cognizant of the necessity of guaranteeing it secure access to the sea..."/

Our editors conclude: /"To our way of thinking, and the principles on which it is based, the borders left by the colonial period must not be compromised. This is why we have taken a position in favor of self-determination for the Saharan people (and we have done the same for Eritrea). Of course, the borders in Africa are artificial, but this is true everywhere in the world. They nevertheless make sense in the context of a political contract freely entered into between all the inhabitants. It is this contract which must be clearly defined."/

Regarding the Indian Ocean, the PS says that /"the island of Mayotte should once more become an integral part of the Comoros,"/ that / we must talk with Madagascar and the Isle of Mauritius about their demands with respect to the small islands," and that /"any attempt to integrate South Africa's naval base at Simonstown into the Western camp would be a very serious threat to the peace in that area."/

The PS favors a continuation of military cooperation, though it calls for renegotiation of defense agreements. It considers that /"the question of military bases must be treated separately, with the countries concerned, taking into account their geo-strategic situation."/ Concerning the new concept of cooperation it intends to proselytize, the PS /"wants to open our relations up across a broader spectrum on the continent"/ and maintains that /"cooperation concerns all Frenchmen...and should not be carried out alone by some central authority in the state... It should also be the concern of the regions, the departments, the municipalities. We must also give vigorous encouragement to action on the part of the labor organizations and the trade associations..."/

For the PS, /"that obviously assumes that these diverse activities will be really coordinated. That would be the role of a cooperation agency whose directors would include representatives of the various bodies mentioned earlier..."/ Does such a conception imply the outright elimination of the present ministry of cooperation? This does not seem to be the objective of the PS. Questioned on this subject, Mrs Veronique Neiertz told us: /"In any case, it is not one of the first priorities."/ On this very point, therefore, as on everything which concerns the goals of development assistance, nothing would seem likely to cause serious concern on the part of the African capitals friendly to France.

The determination to provide African countries greater economic security, to hasten the creation of economic groupings, to revive research, to give special treatment to agriculture, to think of industrial development only as a complement to rural activities, to enhance the cultural dimension of cooperation, the refusal to /"stand back coolly on our heritage"/--all this is, in fact, rather seductive. It must be added that the PS platform will not necessarily be that of the president, who from all indications will take a special interest in African issues and does not intend to consider himself only as a representative of the socialist voters.

## CENTER PARTY CHAIRMAN DISCUSSED CHANCE FOR NONSOCIALIST RULE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jun 81 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] The Center Party chairman definitely rejects statements of displeasure by fellow party members with respect to a coalition government with the Conservative Party. "We are not in politics for the fun of it, but to exert influence. I trust the center parties will have more influence in a coalition government with the Conservatives than by sitting in opposition. It is our parliamentary duty to facilitate a change of government. The Center Party is seriously working for a nonsocialist coalition government", Johan J. Jakobsen pointed out on a campaign trip to Nordland.

Concerning the law regulating the use of natural resources, Jakobsen asserted: "The Center Party has never considered the state's right of preemption of a 'holy cow'. We have proposed concrete changes in that ruling."

Party voters in the North are also concerned about the Center Party's position on a government coalition. This issue is subject to debate wherever Johan J. Jakobsen travels. Most express satisfaction with the party's position, while some feel that the Center Party cannot form a coalition government with the Conservative Party because the two parties have different opinions about the law regulating the use of natural resources, for example. The party chairman does not fail to challenge the latter point.

"If we in the Center Party see that laws, whatever they may be, are not working well in practice, we, of course, are willing to take the consequence and to adjust them. As far as the State's right of preemption is concerned, there is not much disagreement between the Conservative Party and the Center Party", said Jakobsen. At a heated meeting in Beana, the third candidate on the Nordland Liberal Party's parliamentary election list, Arne Langeest, said he was shocked about the Center Party chairman's statement with respect to the law regulating the use of natural resources. However, Jakobsen took the Liberal Party representative's shock very calmly and said he was surprised that that is all it took to shock the Liberal Party.

At that meeting Johan J. Jakobsen pointed out that the Center Party will help to relieve the present government and that his party will be part of the new government instead of the Liberal Party, which, according to Jakobsen, has only promised to support a three-party government on an issue-to-issue basis.

Even though the Center Party's charm offensive has been very successful in Nordland, not everyone gives Johan J. Jakobsen the opportunity to say he is the district's best friend. On occasion, the smiling Trønder is obliged to listen to statements like: "The Center Party is not for me. I am sick and tired of bread-and-butter politicians. Why should I vote for the Center Party when I do not even have a chicken?"

However, the traveling pair engaged in district politics, Johan H. Jakobsen and the Nordland Center Party's first candidate on the parliamentary election list, Peter Angelsen, take most of the bitter remarks with a smile. When they cannot sell the party program, they use the emergency solution: Can we offer you the Center Party pill, guaranteed sugar-free! Peter Angelsen hopes to get the full support of voters engaged in the fishing industry in Nordland.

However, a large number of people AFTENPOSTEN talked to in that district believe that the Labor Party and the Conservative Party will bring in the biggest catch from this industry. But the fishing-boat owner from Lofoten is optimistic: "Voters need a Center Party man who fully understands the fishing policy", asserted Angelsen with a mischievous twinkle in his eye. "Much higher prices have led to greatly increased expenses, which makes profitability virtually impossible. This is particularly true when it comes to new boats. There must be a more reasonable balance between expenses and income in the fishing industry", the solid fisherman said. He also promises Nordland he will work to get investment grants to build new fishing vessels.

8932

C80: 3108/159



## PAPER CLAIMS CONSERVATIVE ORGAN WRONG ON COALITION OUTLOOK

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 13 Jun 81 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text] "Our opinions are solidly based", has been AFTENPOSTEN's slogan throughout the years. We have always considered this to be a seamy publicity trick which does not meet the marketing law requirement that a message be true. Our assumptions have been strengthened the last few months. The political reporting and commentary by the Conservative Party's principle organ in recent months and weeks have in no way reflected that "our opinions are solidly based". It might rather be said that "our opinions are based on confused thinking".

Since the parliamentary representatives of the Christian People's Party--followed by the national party congress--submitted the abortion ultimatum to "the coalition parties", AFTENPOSTEN completely lost its head. In editorials and reports, the paper raged against the party and the nonsocialist cooperation was all but abandoned time after time. Now--3 and 1/2 months later--the same cooperation is being discussed as practically void of problems and most desirable. This, in spite of the fact that the situation has not changed with respect to a single issue. The Christian People's Party still stands by its abortion ultimatum to the Conservative Party.

In order to substantiate our contentions, we cite some quotations from AFTENPOSTEN which appeared shortly after the adoption of the abortion ultimatum.

"This course of action shows that one is actually not suited for political cooperation at all .... If the Christian People's Party stands by its ultimatum with respect to participation in a nonsocialist government--it simply means that a majority nonsocialist government no longer will be a real possibility following the election this fall." (Editorial 20 February.)

"But if the Christian People's Party stands by its congressional resolution, we maintain that a minority government by the Conservative Party is the only real alternative as far as the nonsocialists are concerned." (Editorial 25 April.)

"If this is the absolute position of the Christian People's Party, which we continue to hope it is not, it can no longer be considered a serious political party." (Editorial 27 April.)

"Since it now appears that the nonsocialist alternative no longer is feasible, which we regret, sooner than later would it not be both right and sensible to follow the Labor Party's formula: the Conservative Party is the only realistic alternative to the Labor Party." (Editorial 29 April.)

This is just a small sampling of an endless number of statements by which AFTENPOSTEN writes off the cooperation and slanders the Christian People's Party.

Lately, the Conservative Party organ has made a complete political about-face, which no politician would ever dare do without being fatally wounded. Since the nonsocialist parties drafted a joint recommendation for a long-term program, the three-party alternative remains as pure as in its youth. We have no difficulty understanding why AFTENPOSTEN chooses to value the recommendation more positively than ARBEIDERBLADET. But the joint recommendation does not contain a single clarifying word with respect to the abortion issue. Indeed, it was precisely the Christian People's Party stand on abortion that led AFTENPOSTEN to write off the entire cooperation. This is undebatable, even for those who see well enough politically with glaucoma. But not for Norway's largest newspaper, which again has been transformed by the cooperation. Listen to this:

"The joint recommendation--the most important initiative by the nonsocialists in this parliamentary session--has provided the political basis for a broad and energetic alternative. One can already sense a more favorable climate." (Political editor Egil Sundar 6 June.)

On the editorial page last Friday the paper wrote: "A good working foundation has now been created for a nonsocialist government."

We shall let all this speak for itself. Further comments have seldom or never been more superfluous.

Let us just conclude with the paper's use of sources to justify its changing positions all the time. On 20 February the paper wrote: "There is general agreement among political observers that the statement by parliamentary representatives of the Christian People's Party must be interpreted as an ultimatum .... That, in turn, means that a nonsocialist government will not become a real possibility following the election this fall."

On 6 June the paper once more consulted political observers:

"Among astute political observers, only a few consider it likely that the abortion issue will upset a broad nonsocialist cooperation."

Isn't that something!

B952  
CSO: 3108/159

## DEFENSE STAND OF LABOR PARTY COMPARED TO SOCIALISTS IN UK, FRG

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Jun 81 p 3

[Commentary by Nils Orvik]

(Text) While the social democratic parties in England and West Germany principally take the same position, where do Norwegian Social Democrats stand? Do Gro Harlem Brundtland and Einar Forde agree ideologically with likeminded people in the new British Social Democratic Party (SDP) or the liberally controlled British Labor Party (Labour)?

Let us briefly list the basic position of the British and West German social democratic parties:

1) Full membership and positive support of the EEC. 2) Active support of a U. S.-led NATO and the placement of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (LRINF). 3) American bases on British and West German soil and, with respect to England, also native and American nuclear bases. The liberally governed Labour, the Norwegian Labor Party's (DNA's) sister party, says "no" to membership in the EEC, American bases and all nuclear weapons, but like the Harlem Brundtland/Forde party—a reserved "yes" to NATO. They see formal NATO membership as a tactical advantage, not to strengthen the military defense of Western Europe, but to weaken it. The chances of doing that are far better inside the organization than outside.

Hence, there are groups of entirely different political opinions in Western Europe today. On the one hand, there are Social Democrats with traditions from Ernest Bevin and Halvard Lange to Helmut Schmidt and Shirley Williams. The Social Democrats want an integrated EEC and close cooperation with the United States within NATO for a strong allied defense, augmented by nuclear weapons, which create a balance vis-a-vis the nuclear arsenals on the Russian side. The other group, dominated by the Liberal Socialists, takes a half-neutral position, with disarmament as the first point and lukewarm, minimum support of NATO. This group includes the "Scandilux countries", the new collective term for the half-neutral NATO members Denmark, Norway and Benelux. The half-neutral Social Democrats in Finland, Sweden and Austria also belong to this group. The term "half neutral" adequately covers Youngstorvet's position.

Since Labour under Michael Foot and Tony Benn stands for the same basic principles as does DNA under Harlem Brundtland and Forde, the difference in foreign policy views can hardly be explained by saying that Social Democrats in larger countries think and act differently than Social Democrats in smaller countries. Why is it that the British Social Democrats, who want a strong EEC and a U. S.-led NATO and who found it necessary to break away and establish a separate social democratic party, at the Norwegian Labor Party congress absolutely, completely and unanimously supported the Harlem Brundtland/Forde position, which is almost identical with the Foot/Benn stand in England?

Are there no Social Democrats in the Williams/Jenkins/Owen category in Norway? If so, where were they during congress and where have they been since? Only by getting down to this concrete level can we seriously understand the profound changes in position within the Norwegian labor movement.

The explanation is simply that while British Social Democrats put their nation's security ahead of the party, Norwegian Social Democrats put the party ahead of their country. They can now bitterly state they have lost the party and are in the process of losing the country. Social Democrats of the type that would prioritize total support of the EEC, a nuclear-armed and U. S.-led NATO, etc, no longer exist as a viable group within the Norwegian Labor Party. They have gradually and systematically been broken, outmaneuvered, isolated and manipulated in the course of more than 20 years.

It would require too much space to detail these proceedings, but a brief reference to the main events will illustrate the development. Social Democrats in Norway were strongest in the period 1948-1952, when a social democratic government under the leadership of Oscar Torp and Halvard Lange supported a discontinuation of the base policy and the establishment of an American air base in Norway (1952). The government was stopped by party chairman Einar Gerhardsen, who also prevented the issue from becoming generally known and discussed in the usual manner (Danish source). Some 5 years later, Social Democrats Lange, Lie, Skaug, Nordahl and others wanted the party to support the first proposal to place tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. They were again stopped and outmaneuvered by the party leadership (Gerhardsen's speech to the NATO Council 1957). The Labor Party's election defeat in 1965 provided new opportunities for a long-desired cleansing of Social Democrats. Halvard Lange was the first to go and he was later followed by other Social Democrats.

When Haakon Lie departed in 1969, it was not because of senility, but because he had been isolated and outmaneuvered and knew he would lose if he did not withdraw voluntarily. The major coup in the gradual defeat of Norwegian Social Democrats came with Einar Gerhardsen's legendary speech at the national party congress in 1972 when he, as the party's unofficial "grand master", absolved minority Labor Party members who might want to ignore the majority party decision to vote for Norwegian membership in the EEC. Norwegian Social Democrats had their last chance at the national party congress in 1975, but they lacked both format and leadership and, toward the end of the seventies, were scared into muttering compliance or isolated and kicked either up or down, depending on the circumstance. (The list of county administrative officers includes the names of many good Social Democrats.)



Today, in 1981, one can safely say that all chances of a social-democratically led Labor Party are gone for good. In the 6 years since the breakthrough in 1975, liberal groups have quietly and systematically attained most of the party's key positions at Youngstorvet. They also control the most important local units, like Oslo and Barum Labor Parties, for instance. Three national congresses in that period also showed that the few Social Democrats who might still be in positions of leadership neither have the will nor the ability to prevent liberal groups from getting the chairman and shop steward appointments that determine the leadership of the party. The list of members in central and government leadership positions today, compared to 8 to 10 years ago, is a good illustration of the changes in power.

But, one might argue, was not the election of Gro Harlem Brundtland to prime minister and party chairman a defeat for the liberals and a victory for the center Socialists? This is the same kind of wishful thinking that was in evidence in 1973 and in 1975. In spite of the fact that both Bratteli and Nordli clearly had Social Democratic convictions, they were not able to prevent the liberal groups from advancing into controlling party positions. Mrs. Harlem Brundtland's ideological profile is unclear at best. During the 6 years she was assistant party chairman, she either climbed the fence in watchful anticipation or openly sided with the liberal groups in all major crises. She was there when Gunnar Alf Larsen and other Social Democrats fell or were pushed out during that period. Not once when the liberal groups strengthened their position of power within the party did she oppose Steen and his inner circle on major party issues. She has gotten where she is because the groups that now rule the party know they can trust her.

The liberal Socialists' idea of changing or socializing the Norwegian society is completely dependent upon continued government power. They must win the 1981 election. For that reason, Harlem Brundtland will be encouraged to play the role of center Socialist until September. She will have the entire party's support for practically everything that will increase the Labor Party's chances of victory. The campaign is being run according to the most effective American marketing strategy. "The Gro product" is selling fast, wrapped in a discreet and trustworthy Social Democratic package.

What will make 1981 a memorable year in the party's long term history is not Mrs. Harlem Brundtland's dual function as prime minister and party chairman, but the choice of liberal Socialist Einar Forde as the Labor Party's assistant chairman. All quiet and slow revolutions are dependent upon the new power group's finding transitional figures, people who have one foot in each camp and who can provide the facade and legitimacy until the new groups get a chance to consolidate their position. Reulf Steen was a useful man in that respect. His usefulness as chairman came to an end in 1980, but his "last hurrah", the delayed statement of defeat as chairman, brought Forde up to assistant chairman. The first important and perhaps the only major task for the other transitional figure, Mrs. Harlem Brundtland, will be an election victory in 1981. If she can do that, she may survive another party congress. If she loses the election, we can expect Einar Forde to become chairman already in 1983. One should note that in the recent history of the Labor Party all assistant chairmen have in due

course become chairmen. The question is not whether Einar Forde will continue this tradition, but when he and the others who stand behind him will find it justifiable and appropriate for the party to openly be led by liberal Socialists.

If we go back to the point I made at the beginning and compare the Labor Party's basic program with the goals that made British Social Democrats break with the liberally governed Labour, there can be no doubt as to where DNA stands. Measured against the above-mentioned criteria, DNA is now part of the large group of completely or half-neutral socialist parties that use one set of glasses when they look eastward and another looking westward. The interesting question, which will remain unanswered until September, is whether Norwegian voters, who as a people have had bitter experiences with the Labor Party's policy of neutrality, will once more support the wishful neutrality which was and is the Labor Party's mark of identification.

8952

CSO: 3108/159

## POLL SHOWS INCREASED SUPPORT FOR NONSOCIALIST COALITION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Jun 81 p 3

[Text] According to Norwegian Market Data's Weekly Gallup, some 29 percent of the people prefer a government made up of the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party. Some 27 percent would rather have a Labor Party government or a government by a couple of nonsocialist parties. The "Center Alternative" is obviously no alternative in the eyes of the voters; a clear minority wants a government comprising the Christian People's Party, the Center Party and the Liberal Party.

These opinions were measured last May. A similar poll was taken last September. There is reason to note that the interviews were made at a time when the debate centered around the uncompromising demand made by the Christian People's Party to its coalition partners with respect to the abortion issue. Therefore, we have every reason to assume that the position favoring a broad coalition government has become even stronger following the report of a joint long-term program proposal.

The question went like this: "It is difficult to predict the outcome of the parliamentary election this fall, but imagine that the nonsocialist parties together will capture a bare majority in Parliament. Which of the government alternatives would you then most prefer?"

Fewer voters are now in doubt as to which government alternative they would prefer if a bare nonsocialist majority was elected to Parliament—and it is primarily alternatives "C" and "A" that have gained support. Naturally, there are great differences in the distribution of answers depending upon the political preference of those questioned and then especially whether socialistic or non-socialistic.

Among Conservative Party voters, about half chose alternative "A", a coalition government by the Christian People's Party, the Conservative Party and the Center Party. But we also note that about 2/5 of the Conservative voters would prefer alternative "C", a minority government by the Conservative Party alone. Among Christian People's Party and Center Party voters, alternative "A" clearly has the greatest support. But about 1/5 of them prefer alternative "B", a minority government by the Christian People's Party, the Center Party and the Liberal Party.

Would Prefer	Everyone Questioned		Political Preference					
	Sept 1980	May 1981	A*	SV*	H*	Kr. P.*	S*	V*
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
A. Government by the Conservative Party, Christian People's Party and the Center Party	26	29	10	7	51	62	44	23
B. Minority government by the Christian People's Party, Center Party and the Liberal Party	7	7	5	14	1	20	22	33
C. Minority Conservative Party government	11	16	5	9	39	2	7	5
D. Government by the Labor Party and one or two non- socialist parties	26	27	62	59	3	4	13	20
Don't know	30	21	18	11	6	4	14	19
Total percent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

**Key:**

\*A - Labor Party  
 \*SV - Socialist Left Party  
 \*H - Conservative Party

\*Kr.P. - Christian People's Party  
 \*S - Center Party  
 \*V - Liberal Party

In the May poll, Norwegian Market Data interviewers asked the additional question: "And if the choice were between a minority Labor Party government and a minority Conservative Party government, which would you then prefer?"

The two alternatives have about even support among those questioned.

As expected, among voters who belong to the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party, a very large majority would prefer a minority Labor Party government to a minority Conservative Party government. But also among Liberal Party voters, a majority shares this opinion. In the three largest nonsocialist parties, a clear majority prefers a minority government by the Conservative Party.

This majority is smallest in the Center Party, where about 1/4 would rather have a minority Labor Party government.



Would Prefer  
Minority Government

Everyone  
Questioned

Political Preference

		A	SV	H	Er. P.	B	V
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
By the Labor Party	41	87	81	5	14	24	57
By the Conservative Party	41	6	14	89	60	49	23
Don't know	18	7	5	6	26	27	20
Total percent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

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CBO: 3108/159

## BRIEFS

MARKSIST-LENINIST YOUTH CONGRESS--Red Youth, which is AKP's (m-l) youth organization, held its 12th congress and passed a resolution to the effect that an eventual nuclear free zone must also include Soviet weapons. "It is simply of no value for the four Scandinavian countries to guarantee not to use nuclear weapons in a war situation when we know that the Soviet Union also has nuclear missiles, whose only possible target could be these four countries. Therefore, Kola and Leningrad must be included in such a zone", the resolution reads. Bjorgulv Raanen, Oslo, was reelected chairman and the rest of the central leadership consists of Arild Ronsen, Oslo, Bo Brekke, Oslo, Unni Hansen, As, and Helen Skaug, Asker. The congress also discussed narcotics abuse among youth. Red Youth is very much opposed to narcotics and supports the newly established organization called The People's Action Against Drugs. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Jun 81 p 27] 8952

CSO: 3108/159

## NIMCU EXPLORES RIGHTIST SENSITIVITY TO NAP INDICTMENT

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 1 Jun 81 pp 1, 7

[Article by Ugur Nimcu in his column "Observation" entitled "The Speaker and His Master"]

[Text] It seems that certain sections of the indictment concerning the NAP [Nationalist Action Party] and idealist organizations and their publication has somewhat disturbed the rightist press,

Prior to this indictment, those concerning other organizations had also been published; but those publications elicited no reaction from the rightist press. Meaning that the whole problem is the NAP and idealist organizations.

Article 30 of the press law states that "Publication is prohibited prior to the reading at public hearings of judgments and all other evidence and documents. In claims and indictments concerning criminal prosecutions, it is prohibited prior to the issuance of a decision not to prosecute in preparatory or initial investigations and prior to delivery of a judgment to continue, adjourn or dismiss a trial."

The law regards the publication of procedures concerning a criminal investigation, "in their entirety" or "as is," to be a crime. If this were not the case, the publication of any report that revealed the opening of a suit or described which incident and which article of law the suit was based on would also be a crime.

So too, neither could the "Events from Within" television programs concerning suits that are at the preparatory investigative stage have been produced nor, as another example, could the summaries of indictments about the Dev-Sol [Revolutionary Left] and Dev-Yol [Revolutionary Way] organizations been broadcast. The law regards the publication of any document relating to a criminal prosecution to be a crime if these documents are published in their entirety.

Two former ministers are being tried in The Constitutional Court. The reports of the investigative council concerning these two ministers have been published at length, yet the same rightist press has not said "publication of these is a crime." Summaries of indictments about the NSP [National Salvation Party] and the TIKP [Turkish Workers and Peasants Party] have also been published and the rightist press has not said a word against this either. But when the NAP indictment was published the rightist press went into an uproar.

## Stop These Publications

"in doctrine" and "in practice" this law regards the publication, "in their entirety," of indictments and documents based on indictments prior to a hearing to be a crime. The press law is not to be circumvented by the publication of summaries of indictments, the legal articles the indictments are based on, the incidents they comprise, or certain portions of the contents of indictments.

Furthermore, the summary of the indictment about the NAF was written by the state-run ANADOLU AJANSI [Anatolian News Agency] and many newspapers, chief among which is the same newspaper that now says "Stop these publications," had no hesitation whatsoever in using this summary, given to them by the state agency, on their front pages.

What is the current, legal difference between a short and a broad summary of an indictment? If the publication of a short summary is considered a crime, publication of a broad summary is regarded as a crime too. Neither is the case. If these are not considered crimes--and up to now all the summaries of indictments have been published in the press--then no legal distinction is currently being made between providing a ten-line summary or a 100-line summary of an indictment.

Very well, but it is also stated in the same Article 30 of the same press law that "publication of an opinion concerning the judgments, decisions and proceedings of a judge and a court from the start of criminal proceedings to their legal completion is prohibited."

Those who regard as a crime the publication of an indictment, section by section and summary by summary, without the inclusion of any sort of comment, are the same people who make specific comments about the same suit. Interesting, isn't it?

At any rate it's good, this way the "master's voice" can be better understood. It is more apparent for what and for whom they are the "tercuman" ["interpreter"].

What is it they say:

-Note not the speaker, but the one who makes him speak...

9236

CSO: 4654/26



## DEFENSE BUDGET DEBATE REACHING CRUCIAL STAGE

PM070921 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Jun 81 p 5

[Report by Lisbeth Knudsen: "Breakdown of Defense Talks Inevitable"]

[Text] The negotiations for a new defense settlement now face inevitable breakdown on 7 July. The Social Democratic Folketing group has given the government such a strict mandate for the negotiations that there will have to be a new group meeting in July if the government's partners in the negotiations, the Liberals, Conservatives, Center Democrats and Christian People's Party, do not accept the offer of 80 million kroner above the zero solution on which the group has now agreed. Several of the negotiating partners have already declared in advance that the Social Democratic offer is totally inadequate. The four parties have proposed increases of 450 million kroner.

In addition to the 44 million kroner which the government has already offered to the other parties to secure the defense of Sjælland over and above the zero solution for defense spending, the Social Democratic Folketing group today approved a further 20 million kroner to the home guard, because of the great public interest being shown in it, and 16 million kroner to prolong the life of the four sea lion-class MTBS, in part because of the effects this would have on employment.

The Social Democratic Folketing group had a long debate on the extent to which an increase of 80 million kroner over the zero solution would be a contravention of the Social Democratic Congress resolution on the defense negotiations, but the prime minister dismissed the suggestion. He pointed out that the three areas where the Social Democratic Party had offered additional funds were clearly justifiable in relation to a number of points of criticism of the zero solution. He also attached great importance to the fact that the new offer would mean that the number of jobs lost as a result of the zero solution would be reduced from 1,500 to 1,000. At the meeting Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen stressed that it was not without importance in the international context for the Danish Government to have a broad majority supporting a defense settlement behind it. The group then unanimously adopted the negotiating mandate for Defense Minister Poul Søgaard, which means that he can make the offer of an

additional 80 million kroner but cannot exceed this figure without a new group meeting. Conservative Party defense spokesman Palle Simonsen said: "It is of course somewhat encouraging that the Social Democratic Party is beginning to move. However, we have now reached the moment of truth, when fine words and insufficient will are not enough. The Social Democrats' miniconcession must unfortunately be taken to mean that they are not worried about losing many years of broad political agreement. This is depressing and does not have much connection with the real world." Liberal defense spokesman Arne Christiansen said: "The Liberals will wait before coming to a decision about the Social Democrats' demarche. We will do so when we have heard on 7 July if it contains more than has so far been made public. That at least is not enough."

C80: 3106/141

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July 20, 1981